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Comprehensive Approach
Challenges and opportunities in complex 
crisis management
Karsten Friis 
Pia Jarmyr (eds)
[Summary] This report discusses challenges related to the comprehensive approach in 
complex crisis management today. The ﬁ rst chapter conceptualises ‘comprehensive ap-
proach’ by developing categories and deﬁ nitions of various kinds of interactions and 
between various kinds of actors. The second chapter discusses ﬁ ve topic areas that rep-
resent a challenge to achieving a comprehensive approach: conﬂ icting values, principles 
and priorities; organisational and operational challenges; how to organise a comprehen-
sive approach; the challenges of leadership and management; and the challenges of local 
ownership. This list is by no means exhaustive, but it includes important challenges that 
organisations attempting to engage in a comprehensive approach must heed. One of the 
conclusions is that a successful comprehensive approach requires increased organisa-
tional ﬂ exibility but also basic things like appropriate leadership, and reduction of preju-
dices and cultural barriers across the range of actors engaged in crisis management.
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Preface 
 
 
This report is based on some of the findings of the ‘Comprehensive Approach Workshop’ organised in 
Oslo, Norway, 26–27 March 2008. The workshop was hosted by the Norwegian National Joint 
Headquarters, in cooperation with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, the Defence Staff 
College and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).  
 
The purpose of the report is not to capture everything that was discussed at the workshop, but rather to 
use it as a source of knowledge-sharing that can further illuminate the concept of ‘comprehensive 
approach’. This, and similar concepts like ‘integrated missions’ and ‘concerted planning and action’, 
have become fashionable terms in multinational crisis management in recent years, and this report 
aims to contribute to addressing the concept more systematically. The objective has been to write a 
report that could be of interest and use for all those seeking to come to grips with these terms and 
concepts and that can help to focus the debate.  
 
The report will highlight a number of particular challenges which practitioners in the field have 
encountered in attempting to coordinate their activities with other actors. Our objective has not been to 
discuss all these challenge areas in detail, but rather to map the terrain and indicate what some of the 
challenges are. Few of the challenges identified have ‘quick fixes’, but some are perhaps less deeply 
rooted than others, and if addressed systematically could contribute to achieving a more 
comprehensive approach.  
 
The main authors or contributors to this report are the participants in the workshop. Their names are 
listed at the end of this report, and we would like to thank them for their valuable contributions and 
insights, as well as their engagement in the discussions and debates. In particular we would like to 
thank the panellists, Giovanni Manione (Director EU CivMil Cell), Spyros Demetrious (UN 
Consultant), Ed Schenkenberg (ICVA Coordinator) and Arne Opperud (Norwegian Army). In addition 
we would like to extend our gratitude to the four syndicate leaders, Elisabeth Schwabe-Hansen 
(Norwegian MFA), Annika S. Hansen (FFI), Turid Lægreid and Cedric de Coning (NUPI). Cedric de 
Coning also made a valuable introductory presentation at the start of the workshop; he has co-
authored the introduction chapter and has contributed to other sections of this report, 
especially sections 2.1 and 2.3. The other parts of the report were written by the workshop scribes, 
Ingrid Aune, Magnus Aasrum, Petter Hojem. Editing was undertaken by Pia Jarmyr and Karsten Friis. 
 
This report, with the above-mentioned Workshop, is part of the Norwegian engagement in the 
Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE5), where Norway participates through NATO ACT. The project is 
financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and is managed by the Norwegian National Joint 
Headquarters. Besides NUPI, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and the Defence 
Staff Collage are also engaged in the programme. Further information can be found at: 
http://mne.oslo.mil.no 
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1. Introduction:  
How to conceptualise ‘comprehensive approach’? 
 
 
 
Cedric de Coning 
Karsten Friis1 
 
 
The comprehensive approach concept should be understood in the context of an increasingly 
complex and interdependent international conflict management system. The scope of the 
crises faced by the international community is often of such a scale that no single agency, 
government or international organisation can manage them alone. In response, a wide range of 
agencies, governmental and non-governmental, and regional and international organisations 
have each developed specialised capacities to manage various aspects of these complex crisis 
systems, and together they have been able to respond with a broad range of interlinked 
activities. 
 
This multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary response has been able to manage some highly 
dynamic crisis environments reasonably well. However, in others, lack of coherence and 
coordination among the diverse international and local actors in the international conflict 
management system has resulted, inter alia, in inter-agency rivalry, working at cross-
purposes, competition for funding, duplication of effort and sub-optimal economies of scale. 
All of these, taken together, have contributed to poor success rates, as measured in the 
sustainability of the systems produced as a result of these international interventions.2  
 
In order to address these shortcomings and improve the overall success rate of the 
international conflict management system, various agencies, governments and organisations 
have started exploring, independently of each other, a range of models and mechanisms aimed 
at enhancing overall coherence, cooperation and coordination. All these initiatives have a 
similar aim:  to achieve greater harmonisation and synchronisation among the activities of the 
various international and local actors, across the analysis, planning, implementation, 
management and evaluation aspects of the programme cycle.3 The term ‘comprehensive 
approach’ is used here as an umbrella concept for all such initiatives. 
 
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the topics typically addressed in  debates 
about comprehensive approach. Further, we will try to help to organise the debates by 
offering some categorisations of the motivating factors, categories of comprehensive 
approach, categories of interaction and some key challenges. 
 
                                                 
1  Whereas the rest of the report is an edited version of the workshop findings, this introductory chapter 
was written separately by the two authors, both of whom are affiliated with NUPI.  
2  Cedric de Coning, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated 
Missions: A Norwegian Perspective, Security in Practice No.5. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, December 2007. 
3  The ‘comprehensive approach’ concept used for the purposes of this workshop and report is based on 
The Comprehensive Approach: A Conceptual Framework for Multinational Experiment 5, Suffolk, VA: United 
States Joint Forces Command, 15 November 2005.. 
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1.1. What are the incentives for participating in a comprehensive 
approach? 
 
Various actors and agencies will have differing motives for engaging in a comprehensive 
approach. Broadly speaking, there are both ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors: some are a result of an 
interest in performing better, whereas others result from the realisation that missions are about 
to fail due to lack of coordination among the actors. 
Hence, some motives for engagement could be: 
 
• Efficiency: Joining and coordinating limited or scarce resources is likely to be more 
cost-effective. This applies to both the kind of efforts employed as well as their 
sequencing, as timing is often as important as the amount of resources spent. 
 
• Consistency: The notion that ‘the one hand should know what the other is doing’ is 
particularly relevant for governments that have several agencies (e.g. military, 
development, and diplomatic). This is not solely a question of efficiency but is also 
about sending the right signals to domestic tax-payers as well as other actors in the 
field. It could also apply to the motivation behind the UN Integrated Mission process, 
where there has clearly been an interest in making the UN a more coherent actor. 
 
• Urgency: It is no secret that e.g. Western governments are struggling with not only 
lack of progress, but even recession in some of their operations. This applies 
particularly to Afghanistan and Iraq, and new solutions are needed. Improved 
international coordination has been launched as one such solution.  
 
• Security: In a globalised world, failed states are often seen as a security risk, for 
example by becoming a training ground for terrorists. However, military means alone 
cannot create a stable state. A whole range of activities is needed, ranging from 
humanitarian relief and economic stabilisation, to democratisation, the rule of law and 
security.  
 
• Politics: Electorates in the West are growing increasingly impatient and less willing to 
accept military losses. Patience with long-lasting military struggles is limited, making 
it urgent to find additional tools for securing a territory and eventually withdrawing. 
 
• Legitimacy: With more actors working together, legitimacy – moral and political – 
will tend to increase. A certain degree of solidarity may also be built, making it 
somewhat easier to sustain temporary setbacks. 
 
More motives can surely be found: the purpose here is simply to illustrate that various actors 
may come to the table for various reasons. This may obstruct practical achievements despite 
what may appear to be a shared interest in developing a comprehensive approach. 
Understanding the differing motivations may contribute to avoiding or addressing such 
difficulties. 
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1.2 Categories of comprehensive approaches 
 
Comprehensiveness can be achieved among various groups of actors at various levels and at 
various stages. These levels and groups often get mixed in the debate. It is obvious that the 
nature of the comprehensive approach will differ depending on who is involved. One way of 
categorising the several levels could be: 
 
• Whole of Government Approach (WHOGA): This takes place within a specific 
country. The purpose is to harmonise the efforts of the various government agencies, 
for more rational use of resources and to contribute to multinational-level efforts. This 
will be discussed in greater detail below. 
 
• Intra-agency: Within a larger agency, several departments may work in overlapping 
fields. Or various contributors in an organisation may seek to harmonise the activities 
that take place under the umbrella of that organisation. One example could be the 
attempts to harmonise the efforts of the NATO PRTs in Afghanistan. This type of 
approach could also relate to the UN’s process of integrated missions where it seeks to 
harmonise the efforts of all or some of its agencies. This too is discussed below. 
 
• Inter-agency: This is perhaps what most people associate with a comprehensive 
approach: collaboration and cooperation involving several actors in a crisis area. 
These can be military actors, international organisations, government agencies, NGOs, 
host government agencies etc. Most of this report will focus on challenges on this 
level. 
 
 
Whole of Government Approaches 
Several national governments have been experimenting with improving the cooperation 
among government departments, with a view to improving the management of their respective 
national and international challenges.  
 
It was the Canadian government that originally developed the  ‘3D’ (diplomacy, development 
and defence) concept, later adopted by many other governments. Today the 3D concept has 
become a general catch-phrase for the comprehensive approach because it so concisely 
captures the main axis of the inter-relationship.  
 
The United Kingdom also applied its more comprehensive approach to the international arena 
and created a inter-agency unit, first called the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), 
and later re-named the Stabilization Unit. It brought together the Ministry of Defence, the 
Department for International Development and the Foreign Ministry, and, inter alia, managed 
a joint funding pool.  
 
The USA developed something similar, the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS), but never seemed to achieve the same degree of inter-agency cohesion 
and participation as the UK initiative. 
 
Various other governments, including those of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the 
Netherlands, have attempted similar national-level coherence initiatives. Most of them 
involve inter-departmental coordination meetings, some at various levels ranging from the 
ministerial to the working level. In some cases more ministries or departments (e.g. Justice, 
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Correctional Services, the Interior) have been engaged, and in many cases these initiatives 
have been aimed at better managing specific deployments.  
 
All the countries mentioned thus far are deployed in Afghanistan, and most participate in or 
lead a specific Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The PRT concept is, in itself, a whole-
of-government experiment, in that each PRT is meant to have political, development, police 
and military experts, in addition to a security detail,. The idea is that this joint inter-
departmental deployment should result in an improved whole-of-government, multi-
dimensional stabilisation and reconstruction initiative within each PRT’s area of operation. 
 
Intra-agency: Regional and International Comprehensive Approach Initiatives 
At the multilateral level, the United Nations, European Union, African Union and NATO are 
each also engaged in various initiatives aimed at improving coherence within different parts 
of their own organisations, as well as between their organisations and the other international 
and local stakeholders they work with in international conflict management .  
 
The European Union has developed a sophisticated Crisis Management capability, including 
military, police and civilian capacities, but it has not yet deployed integrated missions where 
these three elements operate together as one mission. Until now,  they have been deployed in 
parallel missions, alongside other EU presences in the same countries, such as election 
monitoring missions, development and humanitarian missions, and political/diplomatic 
council and commission representation. The EU has developed a new civilian/military 
coordination tool (CMCO) to manage coordination among the Crisis Management actors, but 
it has not yet developed a capacity to integrate its Crisis Management, development and 
humanitarian missions. 
 
NATO has made explicit reference to the importance of a comprehensive approach to respond 
to the challenges in Afghanistan and elsewhere in its 2006 Riga Summit and 2008 Bucharest 
Summit Declarations.4 NATO is essentially a military alliance and can only deploy as such. 
As it is incapable of achieving a system-wide effect on its own, NATO can thus participate 
only in a larger comprehensive approach. However, it has been developing an Effects Based 
Approach to Operations (EBAO), which could be interpreted as the military contribution to a 
comprehensive approach. EBAO is based on effects-based management not unlike the results-
based management applied by many civilian organisations, focusing on the results of the 
actions rather than the actions themselves. As such, it has the potential of at least partly 
bridging the civilian/military gap: for example, the development of indicators and 
measurements could be conducted in a more cooperative manner than today.  Work on 
improving cordination among the various national PRTs in Afghanistan can also be regarded 
as an attempt at intra-agency coordination. 
 
It is the United Nations that has, to date, made the most progress in achieving a 
comprehensive approach. The UN system is considering some of the recommendations of the 
high-level panel on system-wide coherence that has looked into coherence among those 
members of the UN family working in the humanitarian, development and environmental 
areas, and is already piloting others – under the slogans ‘Delivering as One’ and ‘One UN’.5 
Moreover, the Secretary-General has approved an initiative to integrate the UN’s political, 
                                                 
4  See http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm and http://www.summitbucharest.ro/en 
5  See Delivering as One, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on System-wide 
Coherence, United Nations, New York (www.un.org/events/panel). 
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security, developmental, human rights and humanitarian agencies under one Integrated 
Missions structure when the UN deploys peacekeeping operations. UN Integrated Missions 
refers to a specific type of operational process and design, where the planning and 
coordination processes of the various elements of the UN family are integrated into a single 
country-level UN System in connection with complex peace building missions.6 
 
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a Note on Integrated Missions in 2006 that 
describes the concept as follows:  
 
An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the 
priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the 
recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximise its 
contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a 
coherent and mutually supportive manner.7  
 
The integrated missions concept thus refers to a type of mission where there are processes, 
mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common strategic objective, as 
well as a comprehensive operational approach, among the political, security, development, 
human rights, and where appropriate, humanitarian, UN actors at country level. 
 
1.3 Inter-agency: diversities in relations and collaborations 
 
This report focuses on the challenges in developing a comprehensive approach among actors 
and organisations engaged in international crisis management. Whereas there certainly are 
similarities to the national (WHOGA) and intra-agency processes, there are also some distinct 
obstacles involved in attempting to bring together independent actors. What is perhaps the 
main one concerns ‘command and control’. States and organisations have a hierarchical 
structure and a top leadership, and may thus apply a top–down authority to implement 
comprehensiveness, if so required. This option is not available in an international inter-agency 
setting, where collaboration has to be voluntary as organisational independence is rarely 
surrendered. What then, is it that brings them together? 
 
Dependence and interdependence 
A feature of today’s complex crisis management environments is the interdependencies 
among the various actors. A comprehensive approach system is likely to consist of a large 
number of independent agents that collectively carry out a broad range of activities across the 
dimensions of the system. These agents are independent in that they are each legally 
constituted in their own right, have their own organisational goals and objectives, have their 
own access to resources, and are in control of those resources: they have the power to make 
decisions about the allocation of those resources.  
 
By contrast, a distinguishing feature of a comprehensive approach system is that all the agents 
and their activities are interdependent: no single agency, network or sub-system can achieve 
the ultimate goal of the overall mission – addressing the root causes of the conflict and laying 
                                                 
6  United Nations, Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-
General on 13 June 2006. 
7  United Nations, Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, Issued by the Secretary-General on 9 
December 2005, paragraph 4. See also the Revised Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, dated 17 January 
2006, and released under a Note from the Secretary-General on 9 February 2006, paragraph 4. 
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the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. Each agency 
independently undertakes activities that address specific facets of the conflict spectrum, but a 
collective (combined) and cumulative (sustained over time) effect is needed to achieve the 
overall mission goal.  
 
Each agent contributes only a part of the whole. It is the overall collective and cumulative 
effect that builds momentum towards sustainable peace and development. If the peace process 
fails and the conflict is resumed, the time and resources invested have been wasted. It is only 
if the combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment 
made can be said to have been worthwhile. The success of each individual activity is linked to 
the success of the total collective and cumulative effect of the overall undertaking.8 
 
Whereas it may seem at the outset that a comprehensive approach will require a whole range 
of actors joining together under one leadership and one organisation, doing everything 
together more or less as one organisation, this is neither particularly realistic nor necessarily 
desirable. Various organisations may have differing incentives for participating in a 
comprehensive approach, and so the level of their engagement with others will vary 
accordingly.  
 
Categories of inter-agency comprehensiveness  
There are always degrees of coherence, interaction, coordination and collaboration, depending 
on the actors or groups of actors in question. One way of differentiating the various 
relationships that may be found within a comprehensive approach could be the following: 
 
• Coherence: Partners, e.g. a coalition, who act upon shared mandate, strategic vision 
and objectives. These will act almost as a unified organisation, conducting their 
planning, implementation and evaluation together. Typically a command and control 
(or similar) element is also included. Nevertheless, in the real world, the agencies that 
are responsible for programmes and campaigns often have to settle for ‘second best’ or 
‘partially coherent’ solutions in order to establish a workable foundation for 
cooperation. 
 
• Cooperation: Actors with complementary and/or overlapping mandates and objectives 
may operate together. They retain their organisational independence, but are willing to 
stretch relatively far in organising activities together with others.  
 
• Collaboration & coordination: This would describe the activity taking place between 
actors with different mandates, or between those who require strong organisational 
independence (e.g. being politically neutral) but who nonetheless share some similar 
interests or strategic vision, and thus see the need for a degree of coordination with 
others. Typically, there will often be a network of coordination mechanisms – some 
more densely connected than others, some operating in hierarchies at various levels 
between the same actors, whilst others are only loosely connected. 
 
• Coexistence: This would describe the relationship between actors with limited 
ambitions concerning cooperation – for example, in the case of sceptical or even 
opposing political and military forces. They may not be directly hostile but could 
resist activities that interfere in their sphere of interest.  A certain amount of 
                                                 
8  For more on the dependence/interdependence tension, see de Coning 2007, footnote 2. 
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communication and de-conflicting may take place, as well as persuasions, or at times 
even the use of pressure or force. 
 
The key here is that the various actors may operate in a more or less comprehensive fashion, 
depending on their motivations, identities and organisational independence. There is a 
growing understanding that all activities are somehow interlinked, and that success for one 
organisation will usually depend on the activities of other actors. However, this does not mean 
that organisational independence cannot be maintained even when participating in a 
comprehensive approach. The actors may all still be considered to be part of a comprehensive 
approach, even if they do not sit at the same table or are involved in visible joint activities. 
 
1.4 Challenges and obstacles 
 
To make progress towards a comprehensive approach, one starting point is awareness of all 
the challenges involved. This list sets out some of those potential obstacles: 
 
• Formalities: Various organisations may have conflicting mandates, no Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) to build cooperation on, or may face other formal and legal 
impediments to collaboration. 
 
• Cultures, mindset, prejudices: The military and the humanitarian ‘worlds’ tend to look 
upon each other with suspicion, but this could also be the case in connection with, for 
example, the diplomatic corps, the development communities, and between 
government ministries like the MoD and the MFA. 
 
• Bureaucratic rigidity: Despite good intentions, the organisational system of one actor 
may not allow the necessary flexibility to adjust plans and budgets to the requirements 
of other actors, and over time. 
 
• Security: Humanitarian actors are very concerned with preservation of the 
humanitarian space – their freedom to operate neutrally and impartially in addressing 
human suffering. This may require distance to other actors in the field.  
 
• Funding: It is no secret that many organisations compete for funding from the same 
donors –  a zero–sum setting that may hamper cooperation between them.  
 
• Priorities: Different actors may share the strategic vision for an intervention, but may 
nonetheless disagree on what is most important to do at what times. 
 
• Resources: Far more funding tends to go to the military forces than to, for example, 
development, even if the latter may often be the key to a successful intervention. 
 
• Leadership: If actors are to coordinate, who is in charge? Is it the UN, or is it the 
strongest actor (typically the military), or is it the main donor country? 
 
• Authority: For a comprehensive approach to work, a more decentralised authority than 
is the case today is needed in many organisations.  
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• Local ownership: If the purpose of a comprehensive approach is to achieve the 
mission objectives as effectively and fast as possible, the question of sustainability and 
local ownership is pivotal. When shall authority be handed over, and to whom? 
 
This is by no means an exhaustive list, but it can serve as a starting point for the more detailed 
discussion in this report. Some issues will be discussed more extensively than others, but the 
aim is to address a number of key challenges. As a comprehensive approach is as much about 
awareness, dialogue and organisational flexibility as about generic models for collaboration, it 
is central to provide a framework for discussions and awareness building. That is the aim of 
the following pages. 
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2. Crucial challenges in achieving a comprehensive 
approach 
 
The concept of a comprehensive approach is based on the assumption that a diverse range of 
actors will be willing and able to achieve a minimum of shared goals and objectives across the 
political, security, socio-economic, and human rights dimensions that they represent. 
Moreover, it is expected that the process of establishing such common objectives, visions and 
goals will generate some level of coherence, and result in more efficient and effective 
outcomes. 
 
Experience has shown, however, that the multitude of mandates, strategies, approaches and 
practices are often perceived as contracting each another, causing tensions and difficult 
working relations. To what extent are these differences attributable to incompatible objectives 
and principles? Or are they caused by factors like inadequate communication and 
coordination? How can we deal with such differences?  
 
As a starting point it must be acknowledged that diversities do exist  – in mandates, strategies, 
approaches and practices. National interests, for instance, often obstruct coherent policies and 
practices at both strategic and operational levels. Multinational or international organisations, 
like the ICRC, MSF and UNHCR, have specific mandates that may not always be compatible 
with the goals of those engaged in the political or security sectors. Even within an 
organisation like NATO, for example, approaches may vary greatly, despite a shared mandate 
and command and control structure. The 25 NATO PRTs in Afghanistan are all run in 
accordance with different national policies, and this sometimes creates tensions between the 
regions. Lastly, it should be noted that principles and mandates can at times also serve as a 
cover for institutional interests concerning visibility and competition for funds and donors.  
 
There are nonetheless several examples where institutions and actors have managed to 
overcome differences, and have come to agreement on overall policies during a crisis 
management operation. Unless the mandates are diametrically conflicting and opposing, some 
degree of coordination and comprehensiveness should therefore be achievable.  
 
At least five sets of challenges will need to be taken into account to achieve progress towards 
a comprehensive approach. Firstly, there is the challenge of overcoming conflicting mandates, 
principles and priorities of different actors. Secondly, how to bridge the many organisational 
structures and approaches that exist? Thirdly, how to organise a comprehensive approach – 
should it be integrated or coordinated? Fourthly, who should lead a comprehensive approach, 
and on what level should this take place? Lastly, there are the challenges related to the 
collaboration with the local actors. In the following, these challenge areas will be discussed in 
greater detail. 
 
 
2.1. Conflicting values, principles and priorities 
 
Working together to achieve a comprehensive approach presupposes some degree of agree-
ment, some shared platform of values, principles and priorities. A meaningful comprehensive 
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approach can hardly be achieved if the actors have directly conflicting values and principles. 
Even if the differences may occasionally be perceived as greater than they need be, this is a 
key challenge in many conflict areas today.  
 
The organisational values and operating principles that guide human rights and humanitarian 
actors, for instance, may well conflict with the values and principles of political and security 
actors, not least in contexts where some of the international and local actors can be hostile to 
each other.  
 
Such tensions will be especially acute in situations where an international intervention has to 
deal with a hostile host government (as in the case of Darfur in Sudan), or insurgency (as in 
the case of Afghanistan), or is engaged in forcefully disarming rebel or militia groups (as in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo).  
 
This implies that a comprehensive approach may be more difficult in the early phases of an 
intervention where there is a dual security (stabilisation) and humanitarian focus. However, 
this tension can be equally in evidence in situations that have developed into the transitional 
and consolidation phases, but where pockets of instability remain, or where instability flares 
up after a period of relative calm. The phase of the intervention is thus not as much of an 
indication as the degree of hostility.9 
 
The tension derives from the fact that the operating principles of humanitarian agencies 
require them to demonstrate their neutrality toward all parties perceived to be in dispute – 
including those parts of the international community that are, or are perceived to be, using 
force or other coercive means against one or more of the parties in the conflict system.  
 
Conflicting priorities 
Such fundamental differences in values and principles are not, however, limited to hostile 
environments. The various actors may also have differing views with regard to which aspects 
to prioritise. Political and security actors may prefer to focus on stabilising a situation before 
addressing matters like human rights violations, corruption, or narcotics, especially if the 
actors they perceive to be the key to stabilising the situation are suspected of being 
responsible for such human rights atrocities or criminal behaviour.  
 
In some cases, the timetable of one may be in conflict with the principles of another. A case in 
point is the election timetable in Liberia which motivated those responsible for the election to 
encourage the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Monrovia to return to their original 
communities to register to vote. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) put pressure on the 
agencies responsible for reintegration to persuade the IDPs to return, and to start offering 
them reintegration support. However, these agencies disagreed with the return timetable 
proposed by UNMIL, because their assessments had indicated that conditions were not yet 
sufficient to provide alternative sustainable livelihoods for the returnees in their home 
locations. This situation caused tension between the political and developmental/humanitarian 
actors because their respective goals, short-term vs. long-term, and operating values and 
principles brought them into direct opposition with another.    
 
                                                 
9  For a more detailed explanation of the three phases of stabilisation, transitional and consolidation, see 
C.H. de Coning,  ‘Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations’, in H. Langholtz, B. Kondoch 
and A. Wells (eds), International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, Volume 11. 
Brussels: Koninklijke Brill N.V., 2007. 
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Politicised aid 
Another example would be situations where political and security actors may wish to reward 
certain political or military actors for their cooperation with humanitarian assistance or 
developmental projects. In some contexts, for instance in a counter-insurgency effort, 
communities that cooperate with the government and international forces are rewarded with 
aid to show that working together with them can bring them more benefits than collaborating 
with the insurgents. Such a ‘winning the hearts and minds’ approach could result in the 
political and military actors placing undue pressure on the development and humanitarian 
actors to provide services in selected areas, or the political and security actors could use their 
own means to provide services that appear to be developmental and humanitarian in action. At 
the same time the government and international forces may discourage those developmental 
and humanitarian actors that provide services in areas under the control of the insurgents.  
 
All variations will result in blurring the distinction between political/military and 
humanitarian action, and thus undermine the independence, neutrality and impartiality of the 
humanitarian actors, in the eyes of the local communities and the insurgents.  
 
Is the ‘humanitarian space’ overstretched? 
Many NGOs and other humanitarian actors are reluctant to engage in a comprehensive 
approach. They argue that being coordinated into the framework of a comprehensive approach 
effectively hinders them in doing their work efficiently; moreover, it negatively affects their 
security, as they may be seen as favouring one of the parties to the conflict. They call for the 
preservation of their ‘humanitarian space’:  to be free to address suffering wherever it is 
found, irrespective of the politics of the conflict. Typically, these are humanitarian NGOs that 
deliver ‘neutral’ services like food and water.  
 
It is a challenge that in most of today’s complex conflicts, politics tends to play a role at every 
level. Also water and food distribution can be exploited politically, or have (unintended) 
political consequences.10 ‘Neutral’ NGOs would therefore have some interest in 
communicating with other actors in the field. Furthermore, many NGOs are engaged in 
development work, which is by definition political in many crisis or conflict areas. The 
argument for preserving the ‘humanitarian space’ does therefore not apply to those engaged in 
such projects. This means that NGOs need to have a clear idea of what kind of activities they 
are actually undertaking, so as not to falsely label their development work as humanitarian. 
As a result, coordinating and being part of a comprehensive approach should be of interest to 
those NGOs engaged in activities that go beyond immediate humanitarian relief.  
 
To conclude, the assumption that there will always be a sufficient level of shared values, 
principles, goals and objectives is not supported by the feedback from the field. Reality 
dictates that there will have to be trade-offs, second-best solutions, compromises and even 
sometimes an inability to come to any kind of agreement. However, this is not to say that it is 
impossible to achieve meaningful coherence, cooperation and coordination across the various 
dimensions under the umbrella of a comprehensive approach. In all these circumstances, it is 
preferable to have pre-agreed mechanisms for dialogue and coordination – even if only aimed 
at de-confliction – where the different viewpoints can be raised and actors can inform each 
other of their principles, goals, objectives and approaches. In this way, when tensions occur 
they can more readily be de-fused in a transparent and well-informed manner. 
                                                 
10  Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), The Unintended Consequences of 
Peacekeeping Operations, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007. 
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2.2. Organisational and operational challenges  
 
Mandates and values aside, the various actors operating in a field also tend to have very 
different organisational and operational approaches.  This is partly due to the differences in 
the nature and origin of the actors involved in such missions. Political and security missions, 
such as a UN or NATO peace operation, come about as a result of a political process, such as 
a UN Security Council resolution, and typically result in the deployment of missions in which 
responsibilities are well-structured in a hierarchical system. The military, for instance, follow 
organisational cultures and structures that are similar regardless of whether they are deployed 
or at home, and they typically have sufficient resources, both human and financial, to engage 
in research, planning and training.  
 
By contrast, most civilian organisations that are active in stabilisation or peace operations 
have been established to play a particular role – for example, to provide humanitarian 
assistance to children caught up in complex emergencies – and their focus is on operational 
action. They thus have limited resources for training and research. These cultural and 
structural differences between civil and military actors and between various types of civilian 
actors (UN peacekeeping operations, UN agencies, NGOs, donor agencies, regional 
organisations, local authorities, etc.) are a central characteristic of these complex mission 
environments. When pursuing coherence at the field level, it is important to understand the 
degree of fragmentation that exists among the headquarters of these various actors. In 
addition, many actors have multiple roles in different arenas – for instance, states who are 
members of vigorous organisations as well as being donors and active bilateral political 
actors.  
 
One of the most delicate relationships in a coordinated operation is that between a military 
force and humanitarian NGOs. NGOs are responsible for approximately 80% of the field-
level humanitarian work. They have a flat network-centric organisational structure made up of 
a number of specialised autonomous agents that work together through a series of voluntary 
coordination clusters. Most NGOs have clear mandates and responsibilities, with 
operationally focused organisational structures. As a result, they are quick to respond to new 
crises, and are able to start working in the field very soon after they deploy in theatre. For 
military actors, the lack of a clear hierarchical structure among NGOs can be difficult to relate 
to, not least in the planning phase where the military are used to relating to a higher central 
command, which in this case does not exist. NGO responses sometimes appear chaotic and 
disorganised from a military point of view, since the former are often is voluntary self-
organised efforts that do not require the same degree of central authority for planning and 
deployment.  
 
In fact, the humanitarian response is typically the most organised and coordinated aspect of all 
international efforts in a crisis management operation. Whilst all the various agents that make 
up the humanitarian response work independently, they operate on a number of pre-agreed 
understandings as to the common principles of humanitarian action, minimum standards, and 
shared policies on a range of issues, like humanitarian/military relations. They also have well-
established coordination mechanisms, including who will lead the coordination (the UN 
Humanitarian Coordinator), how the coordination system will function (the Cluster system, 
with pre-agreed lead agencies in various pre-agreed categories of action) and joint resource 
mobilisation tools (the Consolidated Appeal process). None of the other dimensions in a crisis 
response effort (political, security, developmental, rule of law, human rights, etc.) has a 
similar clear, transparent and pre-agreed system of coordination.  
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Building a comprehensive approach between organisations with different modes of operation, 
organisational structures, hierarchies and command & control systems, requires some degree 
of bridging between them. How can this be organised? 
 
2.3. How to organise a comprehensive approach? 
 
At the outset, it must be recognised that there are very real principled, security-related and 
organisational factors that may hinder closer cooperation, and that true cooperation will 
depend on the specific circumstances of the crisis. In some missions more cooperation may be 
possible, whilst in other circumstances, depending in particular on the degree to which the 
military component of a mission is engaged in combat, less cooperation will be possible. 
There is also likely to be a core group that works more closely together, with others on the 
periphery at varying distances from the core group. A comprehensive approach thus does not 
mean that all actors are equally engaged in the cooperative venture, but that there is at least a 
meaningful core pursuing joint assessments, joint planning, etc.  There seem to be two main 
schools of thought about how to pursue a comprehensive approach: in this report we refer to 
them as the ‘integrated approach’ and the ‘coordinated approach’. 
 
 Integrated approach 
In the integrated approach, the aim is to develop systems, processes and structures that will 
ensure that all the different dimensions are integrated into one holistic effort. Such an effort 
will pursue integration at all levels, starting with concepts and principles. Once the various 
agents have a common vocabulary and understanding of the concepts (which implies 
developing new concepts together), they can start working together on a common 
understanding of their overall theory of change and operational doctrine. They will undertake 
an integrated assessment, do integrated planning, manage the implementation together and 
monitor an evaluate progress against pre-agreed indicators of progress. Some will also stress 
the use of technology to facilitate integration. The overall advantage of such a system lies in 
the cohesive and concerted action it could generate.  
 
Potential pitfalls involve managing the enormous complexity, and the distortions that may be 
generated by a process that seeks, at least as a starting point, the lowest common denominator. 
The UN has, with some degree of success, managed to achieve integration within its 
peacekeeping operations, and between these operations and the UN humanitarian and 
development community. However, extending such integration to all the actors that are 
stakeholders in the context of a comprehensive approach would be a daunting task. There is 
also a danger that too much focus on cohesion may lead to ‘group-think’, whereby opposing 
and competing views are discouraged for the sake of integration. Pursuing such an option 
would require enormous effort and political will, time and resources from all concerned. One 
aspect indicated above is the disproportional resources available to the various actors that 
would need to be engaged in this process. In practice, this inequality has led to the military 
actors having more influence on the conceptualisation of the comprehensive approach than 
their civilian counterparts.  There are also concerns that the amount of effort required to 
achieve integration among the international actors would leave scant time and resources for 
coordination with local authorities and communities.   
 
Coordinated approach 
The main difference between the ‘integrated approach’ and the ‘coordinated approach’ is that 
whilst the latter also seeks coherence, it attempts to do so without requiring the various 
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dimensions to integrate to the same degree as the former does. Instead, the coordinated 
approach favours utilising the diversity of the actors as a way to manage the complexity, 
whilst pursuing coherence through bringing the various dimensions together at the country 
level. This approach values the advantages of independent action, and seeks to coordinate 
among them, rather than integrating them into a single, larger entity. The coordinated 
approach does not pursue coherence at all levels – only at the strategic country level, where 
there is a facilitated initiative to formulate common objectives and goals. It then encourages 
each agent to undertake its own operational or implementation planning, according to its own 
principles, mandates and resources, but in a coordinated fashion.  
 
Operational coordination already takes place in most missions. However, it tends to be a 
facilitated coordination process aimed at creating situational awareness that can stimulate 
synchronisation. In a comprehensive approach, the objective would be to go one step further 
and aim at coordinated action. In some circumstances, such coordination could include joint 
planning and division of tasks, but always on a voluntary basis. At the strategic country level, 
special initiatives are undertaken to develop a common understanding of the remaining 
challenges. There should also be a joint initiative aimed at monitoring and evaluating the 
overall situation against the common objectives and goals, by processing the feedback 
generated by the dimensions and clusters that comprise the response system.  
 
The advantage of the coordinated approach is that it provides for the freedom of action and 
independence that most civilian actors demand as a prerequisite for coordination. Such a 
loosely coordinated system can also be very flexible in the face of new demands: it does not 
require a central authority to consider, authorise and plan a response. Instead, parts of the 
system are likely to respond on the basis of their mandate and principles. A coordinated 
approach is unlikely to generate the level of coherence that the integrated approach may be 
able to produce, but it will probably involve many more agents in its comprehensive 
approach. The self-synchronisation effect on which the coordinated approach relies needs 
time to work, and is more vague and ambiguous than the integrated approach. That makes it 
more difficult to support and to engage with.11 
 
The most effective approach is likely to be a combination of both: an integrated approach 
among a core group of basically like-minded actors who are willing and able to work together 
closely and have integrated systems for assessment, planning, mission management and 
monitoring and evaluation, together with a coordinated approach for and with those actors 
that are more loosely interlinked with the core. Using both can ensure that the process is as 
inclusive and flexible as possible, and that it utilises coordination methods that match the 
cultures, mandates, structures and situational factors of the various actors, over time.  
 
 
2.4. Challenges of leadership and management 
 
The identification and definition of roles and responsibilities and who has the lead on 
processes, planning etc., is crucial tofostering better coordination and integration of efforts 
                                                 
11  For more on this complex-sensitive approach to coordination, see Cedric de Coning, Civil-Military 
Coordination and Complex Peacebuilding Systems, in Ankersen, C. (ed.) Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-
Conflict Operations Emerging Theory and Practice, Routledge, 2008, London. 
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and impact. Multiple international actors in the same theatre create challenges for 
coordination and leadership, as recent examples from Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan have 
demonstrated. The old saying that ‘everybody wants coordination, but no one wants to be 
coordinated’ often holds true. There is a need to understand how the presence of multiple 
international actors and a lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities affect the issues of 
accountability, national ownership and leadership.  
 
 
Who: legitimacy or influence? 
Who should take the lead in coordination? That is a difficult question. Two different models 
might be advanced, where either the most legitimate or the strongest actor is chosen for this 
role. In some areas, this might be one and the same actor, e.g. the UN; elsewhere, the two 
might be two different organisations or countries. In the end, the answer to who gets to lead a 
comprehensive approach should depend on whether or not this actor possesses the necessary 
qualities for coordinating others. This includes the power to persuade other, potentially 
reluctant, actors. It is important that the actors that make the key decisions are the same actors 
that can actually implement and fund them, in order to avoid empty promises. Not all voices 
can be taken into account in equal measure.  
 
Moreover, a leader will have to be able to serve as broker between several actors with 
conflicting interests. Actors might have different incentives for seeking coordination. So, to 
act as leader in a comprehensive approach and to reconcile these interests, it is necessary to 
have insight into the views and values of different actors. In general, the UN is seen as the 
most legitimate actor for the lead role in coordination. However, while the UN has become 
increasingly good at integrating its own agencies (through e.g. the Delivery as One and 
Integrated Missions concepts), it can still improve its mechanisms for coordinating effectively 
and efficiently with other actors in the fields of security and development. 
 
Where: HQ or theatre? 
Even if a leader of coordination has been established, a crucial question remains: where, and 
at what level, the coordination is to take place. In theory, one could assume that coordination 
on the strategic levels (HQ) would be most efficient, as this would provide the actors in the 
field with a shared framework.  
 
Whereas such frameworks can certainly be useful, and indeed often necessary, it is 
nonetheless a fact that in order to be sensitive to the specificities of individual conflicts and be 
able to include local actors, the most effective coordination needs to take place at the in-
country/theatre level. This is where the local knowledge is strongest and where re-
organisation and re-planning most efficiently takes place to adapt to an evolving crisis 
environment. However, for this to be successful, the coordination would have to begin at the 
strategic level, so that relevant and appropriate resources and authority are delegated to the in-
theatre leadership in-theatre. For many organisations this would mean delegating budgetary 
and management authority downwards in the structure, giving the in-theatre staff the 
necessary leverage to be able to engage with other actors and adjust plans and programmes 
accordingly.  
 
 
How: need for new management policies 
Currently dominant management models of international actors often prove inadequate for 
dealing with the highly dynamic, complex and interdependent context of today’s crises. There 
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is a need to adjust these, or even to develop new management models designed to cope with 
the particular needs a comprehensive approach would require.  
 
Managers are traditionally supposed to ensure that projects are managed with a view to goals 
and objectives, according to pre-approved budgets and inputs, so as to produce pre-
determined outputs. Deviations from the project plan are often frowned on and may attract 
unwanted scrutiny, so significant motivation may be required. The model is there to ensure 
that the project is carried out according to plan and within budget. It typically makes no or 
little provision for coordination with other projects, or adaptation to a highly dynamic 
environment.  
 
However, a comprehensive approach requires that each programme understands not only its 
independent reality, but also its interdependent reality. Each programme is independent in that 
it is executed under the auspices of a certain bureaucratic organisation that exists as a legal 
entity that has its own budget and the authority, and responsibility, to manage the programme. 
On the other hand, each programme is also interdependent in that its meaning is derived from 
its part in the larger system: it contributes to achieving a specific effect that makes sense only 
if one takes into account that others are contributing towards other effects, and that the total 
combined effect is necessary to achieve momentum.  
 
In such a context, a programme manager needs to be able to establish and maintain a network 
that can ensure that the particular programme is connected with other programmes that may 
have an influence on its outcome, and that will result in it being able to adjust to changes 
elsewhere in the system. Changes to the plan should not be frowned upon but expected, and 
managers should plan for and report on their efforts to ensure coherence, coordination and 
adaptation. 
  
The comprehensive approach also requires a culture change within the higher headquarters. 
Those responsible for developing policy, as well as those planning and managing specific 
interventions, should be required to recognise and counter the tendency of their own 
bureaucracies to be self-serving and pre-occupied with self-preservation, and should instead 
encourage an organisational culture, at headquarters as well as in the field, that embraces both 
the independent and interdependent realities of working in this highly dynamic and complex 
environment. 
 
2.5. The challenge of local ownership  
 
The question of how to relate to the population in a crisis area is pivotal to any intervention or 
engagement. It involves issues concerning the sustainability of the processes, leadership and 
representativeness, accountability and responsibility, democracy and ultimately the ‘exit 
strategy’ of the international community. A comprehensive approach could help the inter-
national community to address this more systematically. In the following, the discussion will 
concentrate upon the main challenges linked to establishing local partnerships and how the 
organisation of the international efforts affects the local community. Because each situation is 
case-specific, flexible solutions are needed to address the challenges of local ownership and 
the comprehensive approach. 
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Challenges of transition and ownership 
First, there are general challenges involved in establishing local partnerships within each 
strand of the comprehensive approach. Dilemmas touch on when and in what form ownership 
should be promoted, who should be empowered, and how to deal with shortfalls in local 
capacity or with corrupt authorities. The main challenges to local ownership may differ in the 
stabilisation phase, the transition phase and the consolidation phase of the intervention. In 
each phase, the degree to which local ownership is considered possible and desirable will also 
vary.  
 
At the outset of an intervention, it is especially difficult to identify local representatives and to 
evaluate their legitimacy and their capacity. Since the local capacity is often limited when it 
comes to the ability to govern and bear responsibility for security and the rule of law, the 
international community may take on more control of the process in the early phase. In some 
cases this is reinforced by the fact that local partners are criminal, corrupt or simply unwilling 
to pursue peace. Also, when engaging in a comprehensive dialogue, internationals need to be 
aware that whoever they identify as partners will be empowered, and to some extent 
legitimised, by their association with the international community, regardless of how much 
popular support these local partners enjoy or how representative they are. 
  
The international community should strive towards a dialogue with a wide range of local 
actors. This is especially true of the initial assessment and diagnostics process, where local 
actors as well as international organisations should be consulted, and use made of the 
extensive knowledge that already exists on the ground. However, it is difficult to give a 
formal and substantial role in the comprehensive planning process to local partners who are 
not easily identified or who may be traumatised by the preceding conflict. To facilitate 
incorporating local input, it is useful to approach planning as an iterative process, and allow 
for increasing the participation of local contributors over time. While ownership may be 
limited at the outset, planning for a transition needs to start early on, to allow the time needed 
for building capacity and structures. In the transition phase – at the very latest – international 
actors can usefully agree on a compact or framework with local authorities to delineate the 
roles and responsibilities for each and to guide the transition to full local ownership.  
 
Security is a pressing issue in the stabilisation phase, and the calls for heightened security 
often override other concerns. This has several implications for how local ownership can be 
pursued. First, the degree of international authority will be closely linked to the level of 
violence. Where conditions are volatile, international forces usually have a more prominent 
role. Second, the need to stabilise may also necessitate talking to and thereby legitimising 
‘undesirable’ but influential partners, such as informal armed groups that may control parts of 
the territory. Third, the need for stability is at odds with the time needed for local ownership 
to emerge – for partners to reveal themselves or for capacity gaps to be filled. This creates a 
perception of time pressure and can lead international actors to bypass local owners. 
 
In the transition phase, and especially in the consolidation phase, the emphasis should shift 
from stabilisation to the rule of law. In this phase, democratic elections are often held to bring 
forth legitimate authorities, and it becomes easier to identify other local partners. At this 
stage, local actors should be involved in the peace process to a greater extent, and the 
international community has to be more tolerant when local ways of handling challenges 
differ from its own approach. It is useful to distinguish between different types of 
involvement. For example, local authorities may have some capacity for making decisions, 
but may be unable to implement those decisions due to staff or funding shortages or a lack of 
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capacity to manage change. In the consolidation phase, local authorities should be in the lead, 
and the international community should focus on assisting and monitoring the situation.  
 
Comprehensive approach from the local perspective 
Efforts to strengthen local ownership may be undermined when international actors fail to 
convey a consistent and cohesive message or to address post-conflict challenges 
comprehensively. The lack of a common set of objectives and of coordination represents a 
key challenge to the comprehensive approach, since it makes it extremely difficult to identify 
who should be held accountable for results or the lack thereof. At the same time, a more 
coordinated comprehensive approach can make better use of conditionality to push forward a 
reform process in the face of potential spoilers.  
 
From a local perspective, the absence of a comprehensive approach can be at best confusing. 
While local actors tend to perceive the international community as an amorphous mass, they 
are actually facing a wide range of conflicting priorities and methodologies. Where the 
national authorities in the host country are weak,  lack of coordination among international 
actors can mean increased fragmentation at the national level. Having to cater to various 
international programmes, projects and partners often exacerbates local capacity and staff 
shortages.  
 
On the other hand, excessive coordination must also be avoided: it can lead to a centralisation 
of power and a bureaucratisation which may hinder the development of flexible solutions. 
There is also a clear danger that too much coordination and resulting introspection can render 
the international community less transparent and accessible to local partners. This can affect 
efforts to promote ownership in that the transition to ownership may be delayed; international 
and local efforts can have developed in different directions and have become disjointed or 
incompatible; and, finally, responsibility may be transferred to wholly unprepared local 
owners who have been excluded from consultations and decision-making up until the point of 
transition. 
 
Transition and exit strategies 
Forgetting that the goal of an intervention should be sustainable local leadership and the 
ultimate withdrawal of the international presence, international staff members often tend to 
prolong their authority and put off handing over responsibility to the local community. 
Furthermore, international actors on the ground might make decisions based on their own 
short-term objectives, rather than focusing on the strategic importance of their actions in the 
longer run. These problems should be addressed by formulating a coherent policy at the 
strategic level to guide actors at the operational level. This policy should reflect a 
comprehensive approach, but it should also indicate how to undertake the transition to local 
ownership. 
 
In order to avoid some of the pitfalls of a comprehensive approach, basic capacity building, 
including leadership training, should begin as early as possible. This should enable local 
actors to better understand the shortcomings of the international community and the 
mechanisms of the comprehensive approach. Basic capacity building will allow local actors to 
engage with their international counterparts on an as equal footing as possible, as early as 
possible. Though this is certainly difficult, the comprehensive approach needs to shift  from 
being basically reactive to be more pro-active and preventative. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
The motivations for engaging in collaboration and cooperation may differ from actor to actor. 
On the other hand, those actors who do engage in a comprehensive approach in a crisis 
management operation are likely to have some degree of shared motivation, vision and 
objectives. The purpose of their cooperation or coordination is therefore to achieve some 
common goals.  
 
Professional leadership, good personal relations as well as reduction of prejudices and cultural 
barriers may in many instances be as important for achieving a comprehensive approach as 
any organisational structure.  However, for real progress to occur, both are probably needed. 
A key to progress appears to be that the various actors in the field recognise their 
interdependence and therefore seek to ensure that their respective activities are coherent and 
complementary. Coherence should be pursued through coordination in the planning, 
implementation and evaluation phases.  
 
If the various actors are to take other actors significantly into consideration when planning 
their activities, this would most likely require both the removal of cultural barriers (e.g. 
between NGOs development communities and military actors) and willingness to decentralise 
the necessary authority to the level where these actors need to interact. This is not done 
overnight, but it may not be as challenging or threatening to the organisational independence 
as some perhaps think. Recognition that all actors are dependent on each other for success is a 
starting point for such a process.  
 
Fortunately, a comprehensive approach does not require the full integration of all actors in a 
crisis area into one neat hierarchical structure. Horizontal collaboration in networks and 
clusters of networks is already taking place in some sectors (like humanitarian relief), and this 
is the model on which a comprehensive approach can be developed further in other sectors as 
well. That said, some degree of strategic coherence is a precondition also in this model.  
 
Crucially, if the international engagement in a crisis is to deliver results and be sustainable, 
the local population must be involved as early as possible. Lack of comprehensiveness from 
the side of the international actors in their interaction with the local actors may undermine the 
perception of the international efforts and ultimately undermine the entire intervention. 
Sustainable security and development can be built only by those who actually live in an area, 
not by outsiders, and a coordinated and coherent international community will be much better 
posed to assist in such a process than one which is fragmented and uncoordinated. A 
comprehensive approach is therefore also a main tool for developing the ‘exit strategies’ of 
the international community.  
 
This report has sought to contribute to the ongoing debate about these issues through a 
systematic discussion of selected major areas of challenge. It is certainly not exhaustive, as 
comprehensive approach is by nature complex and reflects the complexity of most of today’s 
crisis areas. What the report has done is to highlight some of the areas that cannot be ignored 
by those tasked with improving inter-agency collaboration, cooperation or coordination. 
 
Lastly, it may be worth remembering that too much effort may also be spent on coordination. 
Most actors in the field are stretched in terms of time, personnel and resources. That may be 
one incentive for engaging in a comprehensive approach, but it is also a limiting factor. The 
perfect plan does not exist, nor does the perfect coordination mechanism. There are limits to 
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how much coordination one can and should be engaged in, in the midst of a crisis. 
Comprehensive approach is a means to an end, not an end in itself. 
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